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Abstract 
 
Following the financial crises of 2008 Ireland has experienced severe economic troubles without a 
clear ending to the issues in sight. As a result the unemployment rate and the government debt have 
skyrocketed and the overall dissatisfaction with the Irish government and the EU has grown in 
Ireland. Ireland has grown from being effectively a third world country in 1986 when the Single 
European Act was signed to one of the world’s richest countries in 2008. Since the accession to the 
European Union in 1973 Ireland has traditionally been one of the most pro-EU countries in the 
Union but following the crises and the subsequent austerity measures introduced to combat the 
crises that support has dwindled. This paper argues that furthermore the little euroscepticism there 
was in Ireland before the crises has been was a sovereignty form and has remained a sovereignty 
form but with an economic twist as exemplified by the Libertas campaign. This form of 
euroscepticism first emerged in Ireland in the run-up to the Lisbon referendum in 2008 because 
certain groups in Ireland feared that it would change the Irish right to determine their own corporate 
taxation which has been a pillar of the Celtic Tiger. It is furthermore discovered that even the most 
vocal adversaries of the Lisbon treaty such as Libertas leader Declan Ganley is pro-EU but only 
takes issue with certain parts of the Union. Thus the conclusion of the report is that, while the 
overall support for the European project has gone down in Ireland, the loss of support has not 
developed into a form of hard euroscepticism, it is more an issue of the Irish not liking the current 
path of the EU but still supports the Union.  
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Project design: 
 
To provide an overview of the structure of the report, I will briefly introduce every section and 
highlight the purpose and the content of them: 
 
Problem Area: In this section I problematize the impact of applying austerity as a means to 
conduct financial policy by taking point of departure in the Irish case. It is interesting to research 
because of the implications of austerity beyond purely economic terms.  
 
Methodology: In this chapter I will outline the structure of the paper as well as discussing the 
limitations and bias’s the author might have. Further the tools of theoretical framework will be 
highlighted. Lastly, the empirical sources and the overall structure of the report will be discussed. 
 
History of Ireland: In this section I will clarify the development of Ireland since its inception in 
order to provide a fuller picture of the basis for euroscepticism in Ireland. In it there will be 
provided ample empirical evidence of a country that has seen an exceptional rise in fortunes since it 
joined the EEC in 1973. 
 
Analysis: In this section the theoretical framework will be applied to the empirical data, this is done 
to investigate and analyse whether the normally very pro-EU Irish have changed their perception of 
the European Union and if so, what are those changes. 
 
Conclusion: Here I will conclude upon the analysis and reflect further upon the implications of the 
analysis for Ireland’s future in the EU. 
  
Problem area; 
Following the financial meltdown on Wall Street in 2008 the western world has experienced 
recessions and economic slowdowns and crises upon crises. The Irish banking sector was one of the 
sectors that got hit the hardest and specifically Anglo Irish experienced severe deficits and would 
eventually need to be bailed out by the Irish state to prevent foreclosing on its assets. The 
exceptional onetime expense of bailing out the Anglo Irish and other smaller banks combined with 
rapidly decreasing tax incomes meant that the Irish state would need to be bailed out by the 
European Union and Ireland received an emergency loan of 85€ billion1 on November 21st 2010. 
The bailout loan carried 3 primary objectives, first, to strengthen the banking sector with 35€ 
billion, and second, to restore fiscal sustainability in the amount of 50€ billion. Thirdly to establish 
growth enhancing reforms, specifically on the labour market. The second part of the package is 
what this paper will concern itself with, how is the fiscal sustainability to be achieved and what are 
the consequences thereof in terms of European integration. Fiscal sustainability has proven to mean 
introducing austerity measures and low public growth which has been introduced in almost every 
member-state in the European Union and in Ireland it is no different. This paper will investigate 
how the austerity measures has, if any, implications for the Irish support for the European project 
and whether what can best be determined as €uroscepticism has developed. This will be 
investigated through recent poling data leading up to the referendum on the fiscal compact as well 
as analysing the changing political landscape of Ireland through euro barometer questionnaires. 
 
Thus, this paper will attempt to answer the following question; 
 
How has the euroscepticism in Ireland developed following the financial crisis? 
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Theoretical framework; 
Rational choice institutionalism 
 
Rational Choice Institutionalism is used in this project as theory of how actors chose or designed 
institutions to secure mutual gains (Pollack (2009). It is based on the theory of the ‘Economic 
Man’. In this vein of thought choices are made based on a rational self-interest by individual agents. 
For this project the theoretical thought is quite interesting because Ireland, as much if not more than 
any country, is generally seen as having benefitted immensely from membership of the European 
Union. 
 
The school of thought can be divided into two approaches, a cultural approach and a calculus 
approach. This project will mostly apply the calculus approach as a way to analyse how the Irish 
have historically behaved in its interaction with what is now known as the European Union. The 
approach entails a form of strategic utility maximization, basically a cost-benefit analysis of 
decision making that disregards the cultural implications. In short terms, what do we gain from it 
economically? The following table shows that Ireland’s propensity for utility maximization is 
stronger than EU15. This could be related to the history of Ireland, something that will be addressed 
accordingly in the analysis. 
  
 
The Irish propensity for thinking of EU in terms of economic prosperity fits well into the rational 
choice framework which justifies further investigation into other branches of rational choice 
institutionalism such as Gabel and Palmers economic utilitarian approach. They argued that;  
‘EU citizens in different socioeconomic situations experience different costs and benefits from 
integrative policy; that these differences in economic welfare shape their attitudes toward 
integration in positively related to their welfare gains from integrative policy’2  
The cost-benefit utilitarian approach is further substantiated by the argument put forth by Anderson 
and Reichert; European integration is very dependent on public support and that the reasons for 
public support are highly relevant. They argue that support is determined by two types of benefits as 
seen through a cost-benefit perspective, namely direct and indirect benefits. Direct benefits are 
those associated with the payments made by the EU to the member states or individuals such as 
structural funds for infrastructure improvement like bridges and railways or CAP money for 
farmers. The indirect benefits are those associated with membership of the Union such as full access 
to the internal market, the free movement of person etc.
3
 This argumentation is highly relevant for 
this paper as it could help to explain the declining support for the European Union as a result of the 
declining direct benefits Ireland has received over the past 40 years. It should be said that the direct 
benefits have been very high for a number of years but for the last decade these have decreased and 
Ireland has become a de-facto net contributor to the European community. 
 
This argumentation meshes well with the 4 ideal types Katarina Sørensen has developed to describe 
the euro sceptics. 
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Euroscepticism as a concept. 
To understand and analyse the increasing euroscepticism it is important to understand what 
euroscepticism is. It is also important to recognize that Euroscepticism takes on a different form in 
different countries, as does the reasons for increasing euroscepticism. Another concern is to what 
degree euroscepticism is, by this it is meant whether the groups are hostile to the EU and are 
seeking withdrawal from it. Or more moderate doubters that see the functionality of the union but 
rather concern themselves with specific parts of it that they disagree with, this could be common 
defence policy or the euro. 
Katarina Sørensen’s broad ideal types of euro sceptics are as follows; 
1. The economic Eurosceptic. Where the Euroscepticism is based on a cost-benefit 
calculation on the economic gains, whether this calculation is accurate is in itself not 
important, what matters is the perception of the Eurosceptic person. 
2. The sovereignty based scepticism. Where the European Union are seen as a threat to 
national sovereignty 
3. The democratic euro sceptic. This form of scepticism concerns itself with the perceived 
democratic deficit of the European union 
4. The political Eurosceptic. A form of scepticism that can be characterised the same way as 
national politics, meaning that if one is a socialist, one may be sceptical towards initiatives 
launched by a liberal Commission President.  
 
The aim of this project is to investigate how the euroscepticism has progressed during the crises and 
thus it is important to establish, first what kind of scepticism that was prevalent in Ireland before the 
crises and further to investigate through questionaires whether the crises and the tools employed to 
combat the crises have, firstly changed the form of euroscepticism and whether the crises has bred a 
new kind of scepticism, specically to investigate whether the scepticism has increased or if it has 
just changed. 
 
Sørensen concludes that the euroscepticism is experienced differently depending on what country 
you look at. What this tells us is that euroscepticism in different countries within the European 
Union is highly dependent on the domestic situation of the membership countries. If France has 
benefited to a large extent from EU agricultural direct benefits in 1983, but to a lesser extent in 
2005 Sørensen’s research reveals that euroscepticism occurs in this specific area in France. This 
does not mean however that other countries within the Union will experience a negative effect, as 
they have not been affected to the same extent.  
 
 
As the graph shows, euroscepticism comes from different angles depending on socio-economic 
settings, as we can see on the chart, the perceived bad effect upon certain policy areas has decreased 
in Denmark and in the UK, but increased in France. It is not the policy that is very different in each 
of the countries, but rather what impact the policy has had and what perception of the impact has 
had that change the type of responses given. The impact differs depending on what policies are 
already in place as it will mesh differently depending on the socio-economic circumstances. 
 
Bias 
I acknowledge the problematic aspect of my own biased opinions interfering with the analysis of 
the chosen subject. The author is a declared supporter of the EU and the EU economic project and 
structure meaning that the challenge will be to be aware of my own normative opinions and be 
critical towards it. I believe that it is possible for me to maintain an objective approach to the 
analysis. Because of this bias the analysis will without question be influenced by it but it is a matter 
of professional pride to be as aware of it as possible. 
 
Critique of Sources 
As a result of my bias it is important for us to be critical to my own sources. Even as I acknowledge 
that reality is out there to be researched, I also acknowledge that I will never reach that reality and it 
thus gives me a limited frame of reference for my research. By my choice of sources I at the same 
time discarded other sources that might have provided a different perspective on the same problem. 
Thus it is important that I acknowledge and are aware that my choices of authors for both the 
theoretical and empirical references are not oracles that speak only truth, they rather speak what to 
them is the truth, a rather important distinction. Having established this means that, even as I refer 
to Katarina Sørensen and the rational choice theorists I at the same remain critical to his 
argumentation and reflect upon it. This goes for all my sources, I will reflect upon their 
argumentation and employ it but never without consideration to other perspectives. A potential 
weakness in my project is my reliance on a relatively low amount of different sources for empirical 
evidence as well as a rather low generation of own empirical statistics and materials such as graphs 
and calculations. 
 
Limitations: 
As a result of the limited timeframe inherent in a project the scope of the research is not as in depth 
as I would have liked, this point I will discuss further in the oral examination of the project. Further 
limiting to the projects usability in broader terms is the fairly specific focus on Ireland. As a result 
of the choices I have made to narrow down the project to a specific focus it is a given that there are 
several angles that I have not investigated and thus the applicability to other places than Ireland 
becomes limited. The reasoning for choosing Ireland is because the country in many ways are what 
can be called exemplary Europeans and up until 2008 was the most successful country in terms of 
economic development in the EU. It is also interesting that despite its very pro-EU stance as 
witnessed through euro barometer where Ireland almost consistently rates in the top5 in terms of 
how the Irish feel about the EU, they have rejected 2 referendums and might reject the fiscal 
compact treaty. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, this project started out in a group 
consisting of 3 people, but due to the person responsible for handling our dispensation for writing a 
project together getting ill, we had still not received an answer whether we could actually have a 
group 2 weeks before the deadline, as a result we decided to split up the group into 3 separate 
projects and thus the project will carry some evidence of this. 
  
History of Ireland 
 
In order to analyse the euroscepticism in Ireland it is important to acknowledge the rather unique 
position Ireland is in, both from an economic but also from a geographic position. 
 
Ireland is located west of the British Isles with around 4.5 million inhabitants with primarily 
catholic backgrounds. The country has existed in its current form since 1922 where it gained its 
independence from the British Empire. It is thus a very young country and has through most of its 
modern history struggled in terms of economic development and employment. The country joined 
the European community in 1973 in. In the 1950’s the economy of Ireland was in dire shape and a 
fundamental shift in mentality towards economic liberalization and free trade was taking place 
(Laffan & Mahoney 2008:13) and thus, membership of the European community became more 
appealing, it was on the ballot when De Gaulle vetoed the British membership in 1961 and 
eventually joined in 1973 with an overwhelming 82% yes’s of the votes in the referendum.4 
Through its early membership there was strong public support for European integration as 
evidenced by Euro barometer. Consistent referendums on the Single European Act, the Maastricht 
treaty and the Amsterdam treaty showed an Irish public opinion of strong support for continued 
European integration. This was though declining from 83% support for accession, 70% support for 
the SEA, 69% support for Maastricht and 62% for the Amsterdam treaty as well as a declining voter 
turnout. The declining voter turnout makes it difficult to say whether public opinion has indeed 
changed or there has just been a decrease in voter turnout amongst the supportive parts of the 
population, which in itself could indicate but does not with any certainty prove a decreasing 
support. Consecutive studies have shown that the people that now chose to stay at home at the 
elections were previously the ones that would’ve votes yes for the most part. This is best reflected 
in the referendum on the Nice treaty where the voter turnout was at an all-time low of 34% and the 
treaty was summarily rejected, however at the nice II referendum the voter turnout was 49% and the 
increased turnout almost consistently voted yes.
5
 However, the assumption that the people that did 
not vote would have voted yes was dispelled at the Lisbon treaty referendum where the voter 
turnout was a respectable 53% and it was comfortably rejected.  
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Ireland has through its complicated relationship with the UK developed a rather strongly national 
political system where the 2 major blocs are not divided in the more common social/liberal angle, 
but more divided in terms of the party’s relationship to the Anglo/Irish agreement of 1922 that 
established Ireland as an independent nation. Thus the 2 major parties, Fíanna Fail and Fine Gael 
represent quite similar views upon policies that should be employed within Ireland. Only the labour 
party and the progressive democrats have real ideological differences in the Irish parliament. Fine 
Gael and Fíanna Fail have both supported every referendum on European treaties and agreements. 
From a historical perspective, the Irish have voted on EU matters from different perspectives, in 
terms of how it affected their relationship with the British, in terms of the economic development 
and in terms of the national catholic heritage (Abortion is still illegal).  
As mentioned, one of the reasons for the changing voting patterns in Ireland could be the economic 
development, since 1973 Ireland has developed from one of the poorest countries to one of the 
richest in the European Union. In the first 20 years of their membership the economic development 
was at best slow, that is to say there was almost no development. Through the last 20 years 
however, it was characterized by what is known as the Celtic tiger, from 1992 until the financial 
crisis of 2008 where Ireland’s economy grew in almost unheard of proportions and the average 
GDP per capita more than doubled and at the same time Ireland changed from being a net 
beneficiary of EU structural funds and CAP money to a net benefactor following eastern expansion 
in 2004. By this is meant that Ireland now transfers more money to the EU system than it receives 
directly. This does not take into account the benefits of free trade and various other benefits of the 
single market, but it is a strong selling point for the euro-sceptics in almost all the European 
countries.  
 
The vote to accede; 
1972 Ireland is a bleak place, from the birth of the Irish state in 1922 until the 1960’s Ireland had 
almost no development in terms of per capita purchasing power; essentially a 1960’s Irishman was 
just as poor as a 1920’s Irishman while most of the western world had increased the average GDP 
significantly. Throughout the early parts of Ireland’s history, protectionist politics were pursued and 
the results were that growth and prosperity were virtually non-existent. At the end of the 1950’s 
Ireland was becoming more open to liberalization and as a result to the change in mentality joined 
the British in their attempts to join the European community. The referendum itself proved to be a 
formality, 82% of the constituents voted yes on the ballot with a 70% voter turnout. An 
overwhelmingly positive response that stands in sharp contrast to the British election 3 years later 
where only 53% of the electorate voted yes. The Irish referendum’s overwhelming success should 
be seen on the backdrop of a country that had struggled economically since its birth in 1922, where 
protectionist policies had been pursued for 40 years and not until 1958 acknowledged the need for 
liberalization in parts of the political elite. The economic incentives at this point was staggering for 
Ireland, in 1914 the country’s average GDP per capita was 86% of the European average, in 1960 it 
was 61.9%
6
, thus Ireland had become comparatively significantly poorer than its neighbours. 
Overall speaking, the Irish economy had been stagnated for years and the population of Ireland was 
no better off 50 years after the birth of the Irish free state and thus it was becoming clear that 
profound changes was needed if the population of Ireland were to move beyond the poverty that had 
characterized the country throughout its modern history. 
If we investigate further into the Irish economy it becomes apparent that Ireland was among the 
western world’s poorest countries in 1973 with a living standard well below the average and an 
economy that had barely increased since the birth of the Irish state in 1922. Ireland’s economy 
consisted primarily of farmers exporting their goods to the UK and the country would, when it 
joined, benefit greatly from the CAP agreement as well it would receive substantial structure funds 
to improve the infrastructure of the country. Where most of the rest of Western Europe had 
experienced significant growth since the Second World War, Ireland had virtually no growth and 
what little growth there had been was squandered through bad public management, something that 
continued after the accession. By 1979 almost all government income had to be spent on the interest 
rate on the huge governmental debt and at the same time whenever there was signs of some level of 
progress the money was spent in ways that, with hindsight, should have been spent differently, best 
exemplified by the 1979 government salary increases of 29% in a single year.
7
 At the same time the 
physical infrastructure was almost non-existent with phone calls that would take hours to initiate 
and a road system in total disrepair. Most likely increasing the salaries of government employees 
was not the most beneficial way to spend the money. Certainly it was not the result of a job well 
done. Rather the thoughts behind the wage increases was either a result of corruption or, perhaps 
more reasonably, the thought process behind the wage hikes were that increasing the wage levels 
would lead to more consumption which would increase the overall production which would then 
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lead to more overall wealth. The Keynesian school of thought that had been prevalent since the 
1929 Wall Street crash. 
 
At the time of the accession Fíanna fail has nearly 48% of the votes, something that will be 
important later in the analysis. The second largest party is Fine Gael with 37,5% of the votes and 
labour at 13,2% as the balancing power, the remaining 0,5% of the votes is split between the other 
parties and thus they have no seats in the parliament, this includes Sinn Fein. Euro barometer polls 
conducted in the interval between the accession and 1986 where the SEA was signed showed strong 
support for the European project as well as support for further European integration. The support for 
further European integration into the common market holds some significance to the further 
analysis.
8
 
 
The SEA; 1986 
The referendum on the Single European Act was held in 1986 and was approved by 69% of the 
constituents with a voter turnout of 44%. The low voter turnout can be seen to reflect a dropping 
interest in the European communities, by 1987 Ireland was only slightly better off economically 
speaking than it was in 1973 with 64.2% of the average European income per capita. And thus the 
promised economic development had not occurred and at the same time there was little effort made 
to inform fully on the issues and the vote itself was mostly seen in the same light as the accession, 
that it was a vote whether to continue membership and that a defeat in the referendum would be 
damaging to employment and the overall economy.
9
 
 
At the signing of the Single European Act the Irish economy was still stagnated, the GDP was very 
low still for a country of its size at 32$ billion but following the SEA the economy started picking 
up speed. This was something that was sorely needed, the government debt was at this point a 
staggering 130% of GDP, this combined with a 65% top income tax and a corporate taxation of 
50% led to a tax trap that was proving very difficult to escape and was a strong hindrance of growth 
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and prosperity.
10
 The taxation had to remain so high in order to pay for the huge deficit, but that 
very same tax was such a strong hindrance for growth that unemployment was at 17% and at the 
same time there was massive emigration, an estimated 31.000 people left Ireland every year in 
search of better fortunes elsewhere, it is impossible to tell what kind of unemployment figures there 
would be without the emigration but it would certainly be higher.
11
 
 
The national election of 1987 is widely considered the changing point of the Irish economic woes. 
Following the election that Fíanna Fail won, severe austerity measures was put in place, public 
salaries was scaled down and at the same time the new government picked a fight with the very 
strong Labour unions of Ireland. This new hard line against the labour unions resulted in much 
more moderate agreements and a social partnership was agreed, instead of strong wage hikes, they 
got tax cuts, thus keeping wages at a reasonable level and increasing international competiveness. 
Following these agreements government expenditure was decreased 12% and at the same time the 
labour unions and the government had found common ground. One of the major stumbling blocks 
for Irish growth was the strikes that occurred very often. In 1979 strikes occurred nearly every third 
day with a net result of 1.4 million lost work days. This was solved through tripartite discussions 
and ended up with an agreement that gave the employers peace and stability, it gave the workers a 
promise of 2.5% p.a. wage increases, which was a markedly lower increase than usual, but instead 
of wage increases they would get tax cuts which would result in a larger disposable income. This 
last part was absolutely essential for the prospects of growth, previously the labour unions had 
gotten large wage increases but at the same time taxes had been increased in order to pay for the 
higher wages resulting in a net loss of 7% disposable income over the period. At the same time the 
value of the Irish pound had been devaluated which gave the exports a boost. All of these things 
combined resulted in Ireland suddenly being in a favourable position for multinational companies 
looking for places in Europe for their regional base of operations. As a result of the European 
common market many American companies were looking towards Ireland who had, despite the 
economic troubles, a fairly well educated population as well as being English speaking. As a result 
of the European common market and the now suddenly stable labour situation in Ireland, Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) increased significantly and Intel as the first set up their base of operations 
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in Ireland with a plant for 2600 workers which gave Ireland what can best be described as a seal of 
approval by a major company. All these things combined set the stage for what is now known as the 
Celtic Tiger.  
 
Following the signing of the SEA the political situation is somewhat similar in Ireland as it was 
when the country joined in 1973. Fíanna Fail sustained its status with 48,8% of the votes, Fine Gael 
lost some votes and labour did as well, the progressive democrats gained 8.4% of the votes and as a 
result of their votes the government in Ireland became Fíanna Fail led with the Progressive 
Democrats(PD) as their parliamentary foundation. As a result of the national election the 
progressive democrats became influential in the parliament and succeeded in tilting the economy 
further to the right with decreased taxation as a direct result. Corporate tax and capital gains taxes 
was decreased from 40 to 20% which led to a rather profound change in the economic landscape of 
Ireland, as a result of the decrease in taxation on capital gains the inflow of money increased rapidly 
because buying and selling stocks suddenly became profitable, the Irish state increased its income 
from capital gains from 84£ million in 1996 to 609.2£ million in just 4 years. 
 
Maastricht: 
The Maastricht referendum in 1992 was seen as a continuation of the SEA referendum, it became 
more about the success of the membership rather than the issues involved. It was approved by 69% 
of the electorate with a 57% voter turnout. The year is also important because 1992 is regarded by 
most as the point where the Irish economy started picking up speed and the effects of the counter-
inflationary policies, tax cuts and a host of other things introduced in the late 80’s started having 
their desired effect. 
By 1992 at the Maastricht treaty that introduced the beginning of the EMU the GDP had increased 
to 54$ billion
12
, around 50% larger over the course of 6 years, this is widely considered to be 
starting point of the Celtic Tiger but as we’ve just shown it might be more accurate to say that it 
started with the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 and the 1987 national elections. Still a 
very poor country at this point but things were rapidly improving. State incomes were increasing, 
unemployment was decreasing, emigration was decreasing and by 1996 there was a net immigration 
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to Ireland for the first time, most of these immigrants being of Irish descent and bringing substantial 
work expertise with them. 
 
Amsterdam: 
The Amsterdam referendum of 1998 was the first time Ireland had a referendum following rather 
profound changes in Ireland, both economically but also politically, a member of the European 
parliament had challenged whether it was within the constitution to use public money to fund the 
yes campaigns for EU related referendums and won. As a result public money could no longer be 
spent in a partisan way and both sides would have to be informed about through independent public 
channels. Regardless the referendum it was comfortably carried with 61% of the votes with a solid 
voter turnout of 55%. However, this was the lowest recoded approval ratio so far in an EU related 
referendum. At the same time, Ireland was changing rapidly economically and this could be said to 
have an impact as well, I will return to this in the analysis. 
 
By 1998 the Irish total GDP has increased to 83$ billion, another impressive surge, from 1986 to 
1998, a 12 year span the total GDP had increased from 32$billion to 83$ billion, an exceptional 
accomplishment by all accounts. By all accounts Ireland was moving forward towards prosperity 
and the average GDP per capital in terms of purchasing power (adjusted for inflation) was 
increasing rapidly as well, in 1994 it had been at around 15.000$, in 1998 it was at 22.000$, 
essentially an average Irishman had 50% more money in disposable income over a 4 year period 
which further increased to 26.000$ by 2000 and by 2002 it was at 30.000$ - essentially a doubling 
over a period of 6 years.
13
 By 2000 Ireland was around the average of the European Union but the 
development of the 1990’s would continue well into the next century. Perhaps as a result of the 
improving economy, the Nice treaty this made it possible for the eastern expansion so that the old 
communist countries of Europe could join the EU. 
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Nice: 
The first real hiccup in the referendums in Ireland was the Nice referendum, a referendum that 
received little to no attention from the political parties and was widely considered to be a sure thing 
just as the previous referendums had been, but with a very lowly 34% voter turnout the referendum 
was declined with a 53% majority, sending shockwaves through both the Irish political system and 
the EU system as a whole. Following the referendum there was a period of adjustment and 
significant political emphasis was put on the new nice treaty and a new referendum was held in 
October 2002 where the voter turnout was 48,5% and 62% of the voters ratified the treaty. It is 
widely held that the lack of political involvement in the run-up to the referendum was the main 
reason behind the no, as many as 44% of the people that did not vote cited their reasons for doing so 
was because of a lack of information. 
Ireland’s economic boom was primarily fuelled through IT companies manufacturing their goods in 
Ireland for the European market. When the IT bubble burst it hit Ireland with some force and the 
9/11 terrorist attacks happened before the Irish economy had a chance to recover. These 2 events 
combined had rather profound implications on the Irish economy. Most importantly maybe was the 
loss of the monetary policies inherent in having your own national bank. By 2000 the Irish economy 
warranted a 16% interest rate vis-à-vis the Taylor rule, but as a result of having surrendered the 
sovereign interest rate to the European Central Bank, the interest rates was slashed to 2%, at the 
same time inflation rates was above 2% which essentially meant borrowing money was profitable.  
14
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As can be seen, the real interest rate (adjusted for inflation) in Ireland was below 0% between 1999 
and 2005 
 
Following the IT crash Ireland changed from having an export led economy to being a private 
consumption based economy that was fuelled by strongly increasing house prices as a result of the 
low interest on loans. This had the desired effect of pushing growth further but the economy also 
became significantly more volatile as has been documented by many reports following the 2009 
nationalization of Anglo Irish. Up until the financial crisis the Irish economic boom seemed to go 
on and on and on until a point where Ireland was the second richest member of the European union 
in terms of GDP per capita as purchasing power. 
The 00’s was a remarkable period for the average Irishman, home ownership skyrocketed to around 
80%, and it was quite common to own 2 or more houses. The unemployment rate kept getting lower 
and lower and this had 2 direct consequences, first, the immigration to Ireland of foreign workers 
increased rapidly and the average wage increased, this time not as a result of Labour Union power, 
but as a result of direct demand for employees, this further fuelled the inflation which then further 
warranted increased interest rate increases vis-à-vis the Taylor rule. The interest rates was being 
increased from Frankfurt as a result of the global economic boom 00’s of but much too slowly for 
what Ireland warranted which further destabilized the already volatile economy. At the same time 
the Irish government kept up tax deductions on new constructions and gave wage increases to 
public workers. Furthermore the opposition in Ireland called for the government to spend more 
money to build new schools and improve the existing ones which would then further fuel the 
roaring fire that was the Irish economy. With the benefit of hindsight it should have been 
abundantly clear to the Irish politicians that providing tax deductions on new constructions during a 
period where the effective interest rates was below 0% was, in the very kindest wording, 
inadvisable. As has been argued, the second part of the Celtic tiger was fuelled by a construction 
sector boom; 
 
 
 
Bank investments in property market 
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As seen on the chart, Anglo Irish, Irelands 3
rd
 largest bank at the time had almost 85% of their total 
loans involved in the construction sector and 12.5 times their capital base, this left them very 
exposed and very dependent on the continually increasing or at least stable housing prices;  
16
 
As the chart shows, the housing prices in Ireland had been rapidly increasing since 1996 and after 
reaching its top point of 377,850 Euros in 2007 it started dropping rapidly and by 2009 it was a full 
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100k Euros below its maximum point. The dropping housing prices meant that people started 
defaulting on their loans as many of the Irishmen had several mortgages in their homes and 
suddenly could not afford the payments; this meant the banking sector started losing money. As 
shown previously Anglo Irish was very exposed in the construction and housing sector and thus 
they were hit the hardest and would eventually need a bailout. When the housing prices started 
dropping it signalled the end of the remarkable Celtic Tiger. Employment in the construction sector 
in 2007 was a staggering 13% of the total employment at around 280.000 people, by 2010 this had 
dropped to approximately 125.300 people, leaving around 155.000 without a job in Ireland within a 
3 year period, many of these people might have been foreign immigrants from the new member 
states but that notwithstanding, the sheer amount of people being laid off in the construction sector 
is astonishing.  
The result of the combination of a very low interest rate, banks overexposed in the construction 
sector, tax deductions on construction left the Irish economy in an extremely vulnerable position 
where even a miniscule event would trigger a collapse in the economy, even if most of the normal 
indicators of a healthy economy such as employment, current account, governmental deficit were 
all positive the Irish economy was still very vulnerable. And thus, when the American financial 
crisis erupted with the collapse of the Lehmann brothers, so did the Irish economy within a very 
brief timeframe. 
  
Analysis: A bridge too far? 
In the analysis I will investigate the implications of failed economic policies of the Fíanna Fail 
government throughout the 00’s, this will be done in order to analyse whether, firstly, that the 
austerity has indeed been necessary, and secondly, whether the austerity that has been introduced 
since 2008 has given rise to economic euroscepticism in what has previously an exemplary country 
for economic development. This will be done through a rational choice framework coupled with a 
look into Katarina Sørensen’s typology for economic euroscepticism. 
 
As shown Ireland progressed from being essentially a third world country in 1992 to being one of 
the world’s richest countries measured in per capita income in 2008. But as has also been shown the 
last part of the economic boom proved to be unsustainable and an argument can be made for it 
having been irresponsible. 
The years following the bailout has been meagre for Ireland, as of April 2012 the unemployment 
rate resides steadily at 14,7% and has been at that high rate for a while and does not look to be 
improving for the foreseeable future, perhaps more alarmingly, the total workforce has dropped 
some 100.000 people and without that significant drop the unemployment would be significantly 
higher.
 17
 
The long term interest rates in Ireland have been begun dropping, from its high point in July 2011 
of 12.45% it is now at a still high 6.90% but steadily dropping from month to month. These 
numbers have to be taken in the context that Ireland has 107% of their GDP in debt, so the 
reduction of the interest rate by 5.5% means that a significant amount of money that would 
otherwise go into paying off the interest rates alone can be spent on reducing the deficit as well as 
be spent on other branches of the government budget. Because of the decreasing interest rates the 
Irish government can legitimately argue that their austerity measures are having the desired effect.  
At the same time as the employment remains one of the worst in Europe the government’s deficit is 
still significantly above what the proposed fiscal compact that Ireland votes on May 31
st
 allows. 
This will mean that Ireland has to either reduce the deficit further, which means further 
diminishment of the economy, or risk the severe penalties of breaching the compact on top of the 
market backlash. 
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Ireland has a very strong export economy with a substantial current account surplus, during the 00’s 
the export sector in Ireland was diminished as a result of the way the growth was achieved, that is, 
through the construction sector boom. The economy was private consumer led and thus imports 
soared and at the same time the average wage of the Irish workers increased rapidly further 
diminishing the competitiveness of the Irish export sector. Following the crisis however the wages 
has gone down and the imports have decreased rapidly and thus the export surplus which was the 
foundation of the Celtic Tiger economy has returned. Ireland has an estimated surplus of 50 billion 
euros by 2011. The boosted export sector has been the one good thing that has come about as a 
result of the crisis and it is also in this particular branch that Ireland differs from the other countries 
that have received emergency loans from the EU. Greece and Portugal fix. have strong deficits on 
their current accounts and severe structural problems.
18
 
Seeing in a full picture, Ireland is still a solid economy with a strong private sector and is generally 
seen as being a very pro-business country, much in the mould of the United States. However, as a 
result of the exceptional deficits on the public accounts following the bank bailouts the markets lost 
its trust in the Irish states ability to sustain its obligations. Because the structure for developing 
growth in Ireland is already in place it is difficult to imagine how Ireland would be able to weather 
the crises in any other form that what it has done. By this it is meant that the normal tools of 
generating macroeconomic growth such as fiscal stimulus through improving the country’s 
infrastructure is not really an option in Ireland, at the same time, if Ireland wanted to apply fiscal 
stimulus it would have to borrow the money for it on the financial markets, and with the already 
high interest rate the benefit of the stimulus package would be severely diminished, perhaps it 
would even cost more in interest payments than it would improve the economy with. Thus austerity 
was the only way to go and as have already been established the effects of the austerity has been 
profound, both for the better and for the worse. 
 
If we look on the effects of the austerity upon the Irish population it is clear that there has been a 
significant change in how the Irish look upon the EU since 2009, 60% of the asked did not trust the 
European Union in the autumn of 2011 compared to 46% in 2007. So clearly a negative 
development since the crisis started, if we look further into the numbers what the EU means to the 
Irish people has changed as well, only 16% of the asked believed EU represented economic 
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prosperity opposed to 37% in 2007. This could be seen as an indication of a change of perspective 
of the Irish upon how the EU works. This fits well into Katarina Sørensen’s framework of ideal 
types of euro sceptics. 
The newest euro barometer shows that the EU is a positive thing for 37% of the Irish and for 26% 
of the Irish it is a negative thing while 33% are neutral. This is in sharp contrast to the same line of 
questioning done in 2007 where 76% believed it to be a good thing. While there is still support for 
continued Irish membership that support has gone down significantly as the economic crises has 
taken its toll. Ireland has not become hard euro sceptics however, it is more in terms of a form of 
soft scepticism where the Irish do not believe that the EU has the tools it needs to handle the 
financial crises, 78% of the Irish still supports the euro
19
. 41% believe that the EU should have 
greater financial means to reach its objectives while 28% believe that the objectives of the EU do 
not warrant a budget increase. Overall speaking, by far the majority of the Irish are in favour of 
more intergovernmental coordination between the member states to combat the crises. 
 
At the same time the overall perception towards the future is very dark, 97% of the of the Irish 
believe that the economy is either bad or very bad and around 60% believe it would be the same a 
year from now. Strangely enough 82% of the population believe that the government deficit should 
be reduced as soon as possible, but the polls leading up to the vote for the fiscal compact whose 
purpose is specifically reduce debt has the yes side at only 53% of the votes. If 82% of the Irish 
believe the debt should be reduced as soon as possibly but only 53% of the people intends to vote 
yes to the compact something inherently has gone wrong in the communication between 
government and the population or the government has issues with other parts of the compact. 
The vote on the fiscal compact will be important to gauge the public perception of the austerity 
measures taken close the gap on the public deficit. It entails that national budgets has to be in either 
surplus or balance. Something that will be attained if Ireland maintains a government deficit that is 
no larger than 0,5% of nominal GDP.  
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If we look at the Irish situation through the lenses of Rational choice institutionalism it becomes 
very complicated to see the mutual gains that is inherent in the framework. With almost 15% 
unemployment it is very difficult to justify how further downsizing is necessary and will gain 
Ireland anything but further maladies in the short run. However, if we look into how the Celtic tiger 
economy was achieved in the first place the validity of austerity as a means to ensure future growth 
starts to make more sense. Essentially the argumentation is that the long term gains outweigh the 
short term costs, but whether this can be sold to the Irish public remains to be seen.  
It has to be considered that the EU has for a very long time been almost a synonym for economic 
prosperity to the Irish. Here it is interesting to look at the Libertas group that was very active up 
until the Lisbon referendum in 2008. This was the first time anyone had brought to the mainstream 
concerns about the relationship between the Irish international competiveness and the EU. The 
group argued, led by their chairman Declan Ganley, that a yes to Lisbon would spell the end to the 
very pro-business Irish corporate taxation system. They argued that Ireland should demand a legally 
binding protocol which would guarantee absolute independence to set national tax policy and 
especially Ireland’s low rate of corporate tax20. Their argumentation is a mix between the two ideal 
types Sørensen developed, that is, a form of economic euroscepticism but from a sovereignty 
perspective. The argument is that Ireland should be able to determine its own taxation system 
outside the influence of the abroad, but they use economic argumentation to argue their point. Thus 
the form of euroscepticism has not changed as such, rather, the way the form is argued has changed. 
Declan Ganley can best be described as a soft Eurosceptic, overall speaking he is for the European 
project but certain parts of it he objects too. Overall speaking the Irish population has very few hard 
euro-sceptics as we see in the UK. Even the most vocal such as Libertas is not against the EU as 
such as evidenced by their chairman Declan Ganley’s article in the independent21 where he argues 
for a federal democratic Europe. The article clearly defines the Libertas position, that the alleged 
democratic deficit of the European Union has to have addressed, but it has to be addressed through 
a stronger Europe with much stronger democratic legitimacy. Amongst the things he argues is that 
the president of the commission and the president of the council should be merged into one 
position, one that is democratically elected but in a form of election where the smaller member state 
voters are not made irrelevant. Another aspect is the creation of an upper house with 4 
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representatives from each member state. The European parliament should stay intact but with 
greater balance of population so that larger member states gain more seats to better reflect the 
demographic strength of each member state. The new federalized union should have monopoly on 
external action in both soft and hard power. Exceptionally controversial ideas from probably the 
most vocal person against ratifying the Lisbon treaty back in 2008. 
 
This last point is crucial to understand the Irish case. Even if the Irish relationship with the EU is 
fraught with distrust following the crises there is still a strong sense that the solution to the crises is 
in collaboration with the EU and that the solution to the economic struggles is more EU, not less. 
As an example of this 55% of the Irish believe that tackling the debt should be done jointly with the 
EU, which is just one example amongst many concerning the Irish mentality towards the EU. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The euroscepticism in Ireland has changed in a rather remarkable way following the financial 
crises. The trust in the EU and confidence that Ireland has benefitted from membership has gone 
down, but the Irishmen that have changed their minds have mostly changed into neutral answers. At 
the same time the form of euroscepticism remains a mostly sovereignty based form of scepticism if 
we follow Katarina Sørensen’s framework. The paper also concludes that Ireland has very little 
hard euroscepticism, even the strongest advocates against further EU integration remains in favour 
of the EU. These include Libertas leader Declan Ganley and Sinn Feinn. While they advocate 
strongly against certain aspects of the EU, they nonetheless acknowledge the value of the internal 
market for the Irish economy and some, such as Declan Ganley, even argue that EU’s main problem 
is not that there is too much of it, but rather too little. A form of reversed euroscepticism that there 
beyond Ganley has been found little evidence actually exists in Ireland. What has been found 
however is that the Irish generally believe that a mixture of national and European power is best to 
solve the concerns of the Irish economy. 
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